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Abstract
According to the standard economic approach, the level of redistribution in
a democratic society is growing with the inequality of the income distribution.
However, data do not support such a nding. In this article, we assert that
the canonical model fails rst in its basic assumption, the fundamental selsh
nature of human beings. Following Adam Smith as well as modern cognitive
sciences, we then suppose that a moral instinct coexists with a selsh one. It
follows that democracy, based on a unanimous agreement and not on a majority
of voters as in the standard approach, can be characterized by two di¤erent
cultures. In the rst one, in the spirit of Locke, individual property comes
before the government. In such a culture, we show that a growing di¤erence
between median and mean incomes is not necessarily associated with a higher
redistribution. In the second culture, in the spirit of Rousseau, the general will
comes before particular interests. As a result, we nd that in such a culture an
increase of the top incomes can quite paradoxically reduce redistribution.
Keywords: redistribution, voting behavior, natural morality, neuroeconomics
JEL: H53, D72, D64, D87
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1 Introduction
Since the inuential work of Adam Smith, most economists postulate that in-
dividuals are driven only by their self interest. Moreover, in the mainstream,
if the public choice belongs to a majority of citizens, the level of redistribution
is growing with income inequality, as showed by Meltzer and Richard (1981).
Considered as a reference framework to describe policies in democratic soci-
eties, this model seems nevertheless inconsistent with the facts. While pre-tax
income distribution is more unequal in the United States than in Europe, the
redistribution level is lower in the former than in the latter. Only few empirical
studies support the model. Most of them nd no signicant correlation between
redistribution and income inequality or the reverse one1 . Extensions, introduc-
ing imperfections in the credit, the insurance or the political markets (see for
example Benabou, 2000), have tried to improve the predictions of the model.
But these extensions remain unsatisfactory if the canonical model fails in its
basic postulate, the fundamental selsh nature of human beings.
Most trade economists are certainly right to retain from Adam Smith (in
The wealth of nations, 1776) that "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
the brewer, or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest." But, as suggest by Sen (1987, 1997) and Akerlof and Dickens
(1982), political economists should retain from him as well (in The theory of
moral sentiments, 1759) that "How selsh soever man may be supposed, there
are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of
1See de Mello and Tiongson (2006) for a recent survey of these studies.
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others and render their happiness necessary to him though he derives nothing
from it except the pleasure of seeing it." They should for at least two reasons.
First, because a growing number of neuropsychologic studies, using the new
functional neuroimaging techniques (PETscan or f IRM), show that most of our
moral opinions, emotional and automatic2 , are true and not the product of
some hidden selsh strategies motivated by the desire for prestige, popularity
or acceptance3 .
Second, because recent empirical studies have showed that redistributive
politics were closely related to moral motivations. As income distribution is
a poor factor in explaining the redistribution level, the di¤erences of values
(including the moral ones) between Americans and Europeans have received a
growing interest. According to the World Values Survey (Alesina, Glaeser and
Sacerdote, 2001), 71% of Americans versus 40% of Europeans believe that poor
people could become rich if they worked hard enough. In the same line, data
show that only 30% of Americans versus 54% of Europeans believe that luck
rather than e¤ort determines income. As suggested in gure 1, econometric
regressions have exhibited, conversely with income inequality, strong and signif-
icant correlations between these beliefs and redistribution levels (e.g. Alesina,
Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole,
2As explained by Fehr and Schmidt (2006), "the term automatic in this case refers to a
process that does not require conscious and e¤ortfull processing but which can nevertheless be
inhibited or controlled."
3See Damasio (1994, 2003), Gintis et al. (2003), Fehr and Singer (2005), Fehr and Schmidt
(2006), Berthoz et al. (2002, 2006), Moll et al. (2002), Ho¤man (2000, 2006), Haidt (2001,
2002).
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Figure 1: Social spending and luck (source: Alesina, Glaeser, Sacerdote, 2001)
2006). Contrasting with a democratic resolution of a conict between people
looking only for their self interest, redistributive policies appear in these studies
as the product of a collective will struggling with unfair income distributions. In
this view, the di¤erences in redistribution observed between the United States
and the European countries would be the consequence of cultural di¤erences in
their moral conception.
As a paradox, the idea of a culturally dened morality nds its roots in the
selsh human nature. In the post-modern trend following Nietszsche, Freud or
Marx, moral is an illusion product of either some psychic features or social con-
text. It implies that moral values are specic to each society and not universally
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shared across societies. Inspired by psychological studies showing that "individ-
uals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get
what they deserve" (M. Lerner, 1982), Benabou and Tirole (2006) construct a
model in the moral relativist philosophy. In their model, moral is an illusion
characteristic of a psychic need and selsh people are ideologically inuenced
(conditioned). Then, the redistribution level is not associated with an objective
level of income inequality, but with an ideology which inuences the fairness
perception of the income distribution.
Against the moral relativism, Boudon (1995, 2005) denounces that this ap-
proach implies that "all is the same", "all is good". Quoting for instance Richard
Rorty for whom the superiority of democracy over totalitarism is culturally con-
ditioned, Boudon (1995) states that democracy is considered good because it
is based on good government principles. Therefore, we feel the superiority of
democracy as evidence, and the idea of democracy cannot support cultural rel-
ativism and is universally shared, as Amartya Sen (1999) long advocated.
For some supporters of the human naturalist theories, in the line of Spinoza4 ,
moral evidences are universal because they are genetic. Moral behaviours corre-
spond then to the expression of natural empathic emotions (see Ho¤man, 2000,
4Spinoza supports that humans have moral emotions as empathy or culpability for sur-
vivance. Summarized by Damasio (2003), his prospect is as follow: "The biological reality
of self-preservation leads to virtue because in our inalienable need to maintain ourselves we
must, of necessity, help preserve other selves. If we fail to do so we perish and are thus vio-
lating the foundational principle, and relinquishing the virtue that lies in self-preservation".
Damasio (2003) stresses thus the link that can be done between Spinoza and Adam Smith.
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2006). Conversely, in the Kantian moral5 , man can achieve, by ghting his
particular nature with his reason and the power of his will, to behave accord-
ing to universal moral principles. But inside or outside the nature, product of
either genes or reason, these two trends claim that a common core of morality
is universally shared and not inuenced by the cultural environment. So, how
to explain the di¤erences of redistribution levels between countries if they are
the product of a universal morality? For Alesina and Angeletos (2005), who
introduce a universal fairness incentive in their utility function, it results from
the existence of two stable equilibria caused by di¤erent self-fullled beliefs.
By expecting low redistribution, Americans invest in their human capital and
generate conditions for low redistribution. By contrast, by expecting a high
redistribution, Europeans invest less in their human capital and will support
later a high redistribution. In addition, Alesina and Angeletos (2005) show
that the low redistribution equilibrium Pareto dominates the high redistribu-
tion one. Consequently, we should observe that Europeans are less "happy"
than Americans.
However, data do not support this conclusion. According to the World Val-
ues Survey (Inglehart and Kligemann, 2000), proportions of people who declare
to be happy and satised with their lives are quite similar, with 89.5% in the
United States and 87% in the Europe (-15). If we follow Stanley Ho¤man, Chair-
man of Harvards Center for European Studies for 30 years, an objective ranking
5Characterized by the imperative "act only according to that maxim whereby you can at
the same time will that it should become a universal law."
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of the US-EU models of society is impossible because we evaluate a model with
the values (and the history) of our own model. Hence, Americans have no reason
to be happier, and Europeans are supposed to prefer the European model. In
this view, and to avoid a purely unconvincing relativist prospect, understanding
the di¤erences of redistribution between the United States and Europe means
explaining how universal moral values are compatible with di¤erent cultures.
In this article, we assume that moral values are universal, but since they are
potentially conicting one with the other, each society needs a cultural norm
dening a hierarchy between these values. It follows that democracy, based on
unanimous agreement (not on a majority of voters as in the standard approach),
is attached to two di¤erent cultures. In the rst one, in the spirit of Locke, in-
dividual property comes before the government. In such a culture, we show
that a growing di¤erence between median and mean incomes is not necessarily
associated with a higher redistribution. In the second culture, in the spirit of
Rousseau, the general will comes before particular interests. A paradox may
thus arise: we nd that in such a culture an increase of the top incomes can
reduce redistribution.
The rest of the article is as follow. In a second part, we present new de-
velopments in cognitive sciences. Based on Adam Smith and Fodor (1983), we
suppose that the two human instincts  selshness and altruism are associ-
ated with two unconscious and independent modules of information treatment
generating two alternative visions of the world, a selsh and a moral one. Mo-
tivations will depend on the selection of one of these visions. In the third part,
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we detail the selection process. Following the neurobiologist Antonio Damasio
(1994, 2003), we rst assert that the selection cannot be rational without emo-
tions. Second, according to an abundant sociological literature, we also assume
that members belonging to one society must share the same vision of the world.
In a fourth part, we show that di¤erent priority norms lead to di¤erent redistri-
bution systems. We then conclude on the di¤erences of redistribution between
the United States and Europe.
2 Unconscious and visions of the world
Since the early 1980s, fast developments in cognitive sciences have signicantly
improved the knowledge of decision making. In particular, the neurobiologist
Benjamin Libet demonstrated with famous experiments in 1983 that each vol-
untary decision was preceded by an unconscious6 mental activity. Some, as
the psychologist Daniel Wegner (2002), interprete this nding as a proof that
free will and voluntary decision were illusions. Others, as the philosopher Jerry
Fodor (1983), father of the modularity theory of mind, do not. In Fodors ar-
chitecture7 , mind is composed of di¤erent modules (from which one moral),
each of them treating automatically and unconsciously its own information up
6Unconscious refers here to the cognitive unconscious, not to Freuds psychoanalitic con-
cept. For psychoanalysis, the unconscious represents what is actively repressed from conscious
thought. In cognitive sciences, unconscious refers to the automatic mental activity that is not
mediated by conscious awareness. In this literature, the term "nonconscious" can replace the
term "unconscious".
7See Nurock (2004) and Pharo (2004).
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to the point of forming a mental representation. A mental representation is
associated with primary intuitions which are both universal (independent of
the cultural environment), precocious (concern also very young children), spe-
cic (to certain interactions), automatic and irrepressible. But, as argued by
Fodor, human behavior cannot be reduced to automatic, quick and irrepressible
releases. Instead, he supports that only one part of the mind is modular and
that a conscious part - named by the psychologist Baars (1988) and the neu-
roscientists Dehaene, Kerszberg and Changeux (1998) the "Global Workspace"
(GW) - exists.
Since the end of the 1990s, using the new functional neuroimaging techniques
(PETscan and f IRM), neurologists (see Dehaene and Naccache, 2001, Dehaene
et al., 2006, and Naccache, 2006) have studied the characteristics of the con-
scious GW. They rst showed that it could hold only one mental representation.
Then they derived then that the access of a mental representation to conscious-
ness depends on the state of the GW: if already occupied, access is denied and
the mental representation disappears. Furthermore, Naccache (2006) asserts
that when a situation is characterized by conicting mental representations, the
cognitive conict leads to the voluntary selection of a unique representation.
Hence the voluntary decision is a selection process, not a creation one.
In the line of Adam Smith and new developments in cognitive sciences, we
assume that choices concerning the whole society, e.g. on income redistribution,
are associated with two unconscious mental representations, a selsh and an
altruistic one, and that the selection of one mental representation denes the
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vision of the world which is associated to specic goals and actions8 (see gure
2).
2.1 The selsh vision
In a traditional way, we assume that the selsh instinct urges individuals to
maximize their own utility by consuming their disposable income w (1  )+ g,
where w is the (pre-tax) income,  the payroll tax and g a lump sum allocation.
For each individual of type ij, the income is
wij = i + ei + j , (1)
where ei is his e¤ort,  and i are two positive parameters, and j is such thatR
jdG (j) = 0. If we suppose that e¤ort involves a utility loss equal to
e2i
2i
and
that the public budget is balanced, the selsh instinct is associated with the
following function:
Sij =
 
i + ei + j

(1  ) +  (+ e)  e
2
i
2i
(2)
Maximization of (2) gives individual e¤ort:
ei = i (1  ) (3)
8Such a concept of consciousness corresponds to access-consciousness or A-consciousness.
It has to be distinguished from phenomenal consciousness or P-consciousness, self-
consciousness and monitoring-consciouness (see Block, 1995, 2003).
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To simplify notations, we set  =
p
 and i = i. With (3), pre-tax
income (1) is then:
wij = i (2  ) + j (4)
Logically, we now associate this instinctual mental representation with the
right of the strongest. Admitting that individuals are characterized by a same
force and that the median individual is the mean individual of the median type i
(med =  = 0), the reference selsh mental state is associated with the following
payroll tax:
 s =
2 (  med)
2  med =  (I) (5)
We observe with (5) that the poorer the median individual with respect
to mean income, the higher redistribution: @
s
@I > 0. Obviously, this result
is similar to the one of canonical model. But it underlines the limits of the
democratic features of this model. Indeed, since the median individual separates
population into two parts of equal force, he imposes his particular interests to the
rest of the population using balance of forces. Far from the idea of democracy,
the law of majority voting in the canonical model can be assimilated to the
"tyranny of the median voter". For example, if the median income was higher
than mean income, eq. (5) would imply that the scal system would be reverse-
redistributive. But as put forward by Rousseau (Social contract, 1762), "The law
of majority voting is itself something established by convention, and presupposes
unanimity, on one occasion at least". In his view, the idea of democracy must
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rst be based on unanimity.
2.2 The moral vision
In the moral unconscious treatment of information, we suppose that the pa-
rameter j is perceived as luck (or bad luck). Under this assumption, a fair
income distribution characterized by w^i = i+ei is shared by each individual,
independently of his own income9 . The logical incentive under the moral vision
of the world is that each people receives what he deserves10 . In the presence
of scal redistribution, it means that the disposable income wij of each person
must be as close as possible of his fair income w^i. Following the formulation of
Alesina and Angeletos (2005), we then characterize the universal moral incentive
by:
M =
ZZ
f[(1  )wij + g]  w^ig2 dG (i; j) (6)
If luck and merit are independently distributed, (6) can be rewritten as:
M
2
= (1  )2 L+ 2 (2  )2 (7)
9On French data, Piketty (2003) shows that the assumption of such a universal deserved
income distribution is funded.
10Forsé et Parodi (2006) show that European countries share an identical hierarchy of moral
principles: rst the guarantee of basic needs, second fairness (like merit), and far less impor-
tant equality of income. If we admit that basic needs are mostly satised in Europe and in
the United States, fairness is then the relevant concept to study marginal variations of the
redistribution levels.
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where L = 
2
L
2
represents the relative importance of luck in the income deter-
mination, 2 and 
2
j are respectively the variance of i and j .
Minimizing unfairness gives the following payroll tax:
m = 1 
r
1  L
2
=  (L) , L  2 (8)
Under the moral vision of the world, the reference mental state is associated
with a redistribution growing with the importance of luck in income determina-
tion: @
m
@L > 0.
In the rest of the article, we will suppose that the moral payroll tax is higher
than the selsh one:
Assumption 1. m >  s
3 The rationality of emotions
Considered to behave as a selection among unconscious mental representations,
decision making gives the image of a human being free to choose his goals (those
linked to the selected representation). Nevertheless, the neurobiologist Damasio
(1994, 2003) states, with Spinoza and against Descartes, that decision making
cannot be rational without emotion. To illustrate his proposal, he presents the
case of a man su¤ering from amygdala lesions (known as the centre of emotion).
He explains that the latter cannot detect danger and hence has di¢ culties to
live in society. Using a mouse without amygdala, experiment shows that the
latter can run towards a cat and be eaten .
To characterize rational behavior, emotion must be incorporated at the cen-
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tre of the selection process. Hence we must dene emotions before detailing
the selection process. We rst dene the emotions which are biologically linked
to each mental representation. Second, as we cannot think of a man without
another man, we consider the social emotions which will conduct to conformism.
3.1 Emotions and homeostasis
In signalling an unpleasant situation, emotions are closely related to home-
ostasis, i.e. the fundamental property11 of living organisms to maintain their
internal environment within bearable limits. Emotional stimuli coming from
amygdala activates the hypothalamus which commands the adrenal glands to
prepare the body to action by secreting adrenalin and cortisol. They also ac-
tivate the brainstem which commands the reex actions which are eventually
relevant considering the situation12 (see Öhman et al., 1998).
As pointed out by Damasio (1994, 2003) and LeDoux (1996), quick emotional
behavior can be controlled and inhibited by the slowly conscious way of action,
i.e. by selecting a mental representation with reverse automatic actions. But,
if the emotional intensity is too strong and its duration too long, the cortisol
secretion will be too substantial and then noxious for brain and for the immune
system (see Hamon 2007). Characteristic of the stress, such an inhibition will
lead to mental disorder and somatic diseases whose end can be death (suicide in
11First characterized by the physiologist Claude Bernard around 1860s, homeostasis is gov-
erned by the hypothalamus and the brainstem to organize the automatic defence of the or-
ganism.
12See Appendix A for a simplied functional description.
15
Figure 2: The redistributive dilemma: when A. Smith meets the modularity of
mind
the case of mental disorders). If we consider rationality as a survivance principle,
we can conclude that in the long run a mental representation cannot be blocked
into unconscious if it is associated with a too strong emotional intensity. In this
case, the GW is prevented from danger by a conscious feeling.
For each individual ij, let us dene his selsh emotion Esij as the relative
selsh utility di¤erence between a level of payroll tax  and the selsh reference
one  s13 :
13 In this formulation, we consider emotions under a negative aspect. Therefore, the bench-
mark selsh state corresponds to the minimum emotional level of the median individual Esmed:
8 6= s, Esmed () > Esmed (s).
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Esij () = 1 
Sij ()
Sij ( s)
(9)
In the same spirit, we dene the universal moral emotion as:
Em () = 1  M (
m)
M ()
(10)
Let H be the maximum emotional intensity that can be associated with
inhibited emotional actions, an individual ij will be able to select freely his
vision of the world if and only if the payroll tax belongs to an homeostasis set
Aij dened by:
Aij =



Esij ()  H and Em ()  H
	
A unanimous agreement on the level of redistribution is then possible only
if the following assumption is satised:
Assumption 2. U =
T
(i;j)
Aij 6= ?
3.2 Emotions and Conformity
Considered under a biological aspect, the vision of a man in homeostasis is that
of a free man acting according to his own goals (as far as his associated actions
belong to the homeostasis set). But considered under a social aspect, a man
cannot be considered inisolation, hence outside a system of interactions. For
most social scientists (see Merton, 1953), after the inuential work of Emile
Durkheim, the construction of a society as a coherent system of interactions
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Figure 3: The redistributive dilemma between nature and culture
requires that the members share the same values and act according to the same
goals. Humans then create norms of interactions and once created, these norms
have feedback power upon humans that constrains their goals attachment and
then produces conformism. Since individuals who deviate from the established
norm put into danger the coherence of the system14 , they are punished or ex-
cluded from the society. Conformity in the goal attachment is required and the
individual action in society is culturally dened (see gure 3).
Recently Berthoz et al. (2002, 2006) and Moll et al. (2002), using functional
neuroimaging techniques, have brought to the fore the link between deviation
from the norm and activation of amygdala and hypothalamus. The conformity
14Moscovici (1979) explains that even a small active minority can put into question the
established collective norm.
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process is then closely related to emotions and stress. For an individual, the
mismatch between his goals and the culturally dened ones corresponds to a
stressful situation which leads organism towards mental or social disorders and
somatic diseases as described by E. Durkheim in Suicide (1897) or by Thomas et
Znaniecki (1918-1920) in their pioneering work on Polish immigrants in America
confronted with conicting norms.
Let V kij be the selected vision of an individual ij in the society k and V
k
 ij
the majority vision selected by the other members of the same society, we can
then associate the conformity process with the following social emotions:
Ekij =
8>><>>:
0 si V kij = V
k
 ij
 si V kij 6= V k ij
(11)
Assumption 3.  > H
Under assumptions 2 and 3, the society is characterized by a fully con-
formed15 selection of representations and then goal attachment, i.e. V kij = V
k
8ij. According to the variety of norms, be they selsh or altruistic, democratic
concepts will di¤er.
4 Democracy and the social contract
According to Hobbes, the rst social contract theorist (Leviathan, 1651), in or-
der to prevent the "state of war" associated with the selsh nature of man,
individuals must "confer all their power and strength upon one man" for their
15Bernheim (1994) explores congurations in which subcultures exist.
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self preservation such as "he to whom they have submitted hath so much power,
as by the terrour of it hee can conforme the wills of particular men unto unity,
and concord". For Hobbes, the peaceful society which guarantees the preser-
vation of individuals requires that all of them inhibit their selsh motives to
behave according to a universal view and then be treated equally. In this case,
redistribution should be characterized by m. But this contract cannot meet all
the conditions of harmony. Indeed, since in this contract some people could be
characterized by Esij (
m) > H, it implicitly schedules the disappearence of the
selsh part of the population. Therefore, it is hard to think that this part of the
population would agree to sign this social contract and that the society based
upon it would be peaceful. As a prolongement of Hobbes, Rousseau (Social
contract, 1762) stresses that "The problem is to nd a form of association which
will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of
each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey
himself alone, and remain as free as before."
Like Rousseau, Locke (Two treatises of government, 1689) denes a "govern-
ment with the consent of the governed". But arguing that the state of nature
is a state of reason and tolerance, he asserts that "the law of nature stands
as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others." In his view, un-
like Rousseau, humans have natural property rights which precede government.
Therefore, if the ruler went against natural law and failed to protect these nat-
ural rights, people could justiably overthrow the existing state and create a
new one.
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Democracy, though it is based on universal values, is nevertheless the product
of two di¤erent norms which lead to two di¤erent concepts:
 the liberal democracy where, in the spirit of Locke, individual freedoms
and properties come before the government,
 the radical democracy where, in the spirit of Rousseau, the general will
comes before particular interests.
4.1 Redistribution and the liberal democracy
In the liberal democracy, individual freedoms are privileged in the collective
choice. Thus, each individual looks for minimizing his selsh emotion, in the
limit of his ability to inhibate the moral emotion. In this context, the majority
rule applies and the emotion of the median individual only matters to character-
ize the redistribution system. The associated payroll tax L is then determined
according to the following program:
L = Argmin [E
s
med () ;  2 U ] (12)
We then derive:
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, in a liberal democracy, a grow-
ing di¤erence between median and mean incomes is associated with a higher re-
distribution if the di¤erence between median and mean incomes is strong enough.
Proposition 2 Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, in a liberal democracy, if the
di¤erence between median and mean incomes is weak enough, perception of more
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unfair incomes leads to more redistribution.
Proof. see Appendix B
Proposition 1 corresponds to the case where the "selsh median voter" mech-
anism applies. Indeed, in the case where the leading value is success (and
then money and consumption) and if the moral restrictions are satised, the
electoral competition implies that if the winning coalition (represented by the
median voter) is poor, it will claim a higher redistribution. But if the win-
ning coalition is relatively wealthy, it will claim a low redistribution or even a
reverse-redistribution. In such a case, moral principles (represented here by the
merit) are constraining and the redistribution is characterized by the minimum
redistribution level morally acceptable. It follows in this case that if unfairness
increases (importance of luck in the income determination), so does redistribu-
tion (proposition 2).
4.2 Redistribution and the radical democracy
In the radical democracy, the universal view is privileged for collective decisions.
The payroll tax R is then characterized by minimization of the moral emotion
as far as the outcome belongs to the consensus set:
R = Argmin [E
m () ;  2 U ] (13)
We then derive:
Proposition 3 Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, in a radical democracy, if the
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di¤erence between highest and lowest incomes is weak enough, perception of more
unfair incomes leads to more redistribution.
Proposition 4 Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, in a radical democracy, if the
di¤erence between highest and lowest incomes is strong enough, a growing di¤er-
ence between highest and lowest incomes is associated with a lower redistribution.
Proof. see Appendix C
Proposition 3 has a similar result with proposition 2 but with di¤erent fea-
tures. Indeed, since the leading value corresponds to the merit, when unfairness
increases (importance of luck in the income determination) the redistribution
rise does not appear as an obligation but as a conscious will. When the redis-
tribution is high, proposition 4 underlines that taxation can become unbearable
for wealthiest people. It can lead to a paradoxical result. Indeed, a growing
unfairness is associated with a conscious will to redistribute more. But if it
conicts the wealthiest people, they form an active minority against the redis-
tribution system. In such a case, as a democratic equilibrium results from a
unanimous agreement, a growing unfairness implies a cut in the payroll tax.
5 Conclusion
If we consider that humans are only driven by their self interest, Meltzer and
Richard (1981) show that the level of redistribution in a democratic society
is growing with the inequality of the income distribution. But Adam Smith,
modern cognitive sciences and empirical studies converge in one major point:
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morality and altruism are essential to explain redistribution. If we admit that a
moral instinct coexists with a selsh one, we show that democracy (based on a
unanimous agreement) is associated with two di¤erent cultures. In the rst one,
in the spirit of John Locke, individual property comes before the government.
In such a culture, we show that a growing di¤erence between median and mean
incomes is not necessarily associated with a higher redistribution. In the sec-
ond culture, in the spirit of Rousseau, the general will comes before particular
interests. We nd that in such a culture it may be that an increase of the top
incomes can reduce the redistribution.
As each culture is associated with a specic redistributive system, compar-
ing two particular systems has a prerequisite: determining the democratic sys-
tem. In this view, the di¤erences in redistribution observed between the United
States and France would be the consequence of di¤erent social models. Indeed,
from Tocqueville (Democracy in America, 1835/1840), Sombart (Why is there
no socialism in the United States?, 1906) or Merton (1949), we can straight-
forwardly associate the United States with John Locke, individualism and the
liberal democracy. According to Merton (1949), the rst American value is suc-
cess in earning money, as summarized by one American idol, Andrew Carnegie:
"Be king in your dreams. Say each to yourself: My place is at the top." By con-
trast, in the French society, earning money is a taboo. It is then not surprising
to observe that one of the rst idol of the French society is LAbbé Pierre who
renounced a wealthy inheritance to devote his life to the poorest. In the line of
Rousseau, the French Republic is closely related to the radical democracy.
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Appendix A. A simplied functional descrip-
tion of the action process
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Appendix B. Proof of propositions 1 and 2
Under assumption 1 and 2, L = Argmin [Esmed () ;  2 U ] corresponds to
the program L = Argmin [Esmed () ; E
m ()  H]. For an interior solution, it
follows that L =  s and then, according to (5) and (8), @L@I > 0 and
@L
@L = 0.
But a "low" (or positive) di¤erence between median and mean incomes can lead
to a situation where Em ( s) > H. In such a case, L = Em( 1) (H) and we
nd that @L@I = 0 and
@L
@L > 0.
Appendix C. Proof of propositions 3 and 4
Under assumption 1, U =
T
(i;j)
Aij =



Essup ()  H and Em ()  H
	
,
where Essup () is the selsh emotion of the richest person in the economy. Under
assumption 2, it follows that R = Argmin [Em () ;  2 U ] corresponds to the
program R = Argmin

Em () ; Essup ()  H

. For an interior solution, it
follows that R = m and then, according to (5) and (8), @R@I = 0 and
@R
@L > 0.
But for a strong unfairness level L, we can have Essup () > H. In such a case,
R = E
s( 1)
sup (H) and it follows that @R@wsup < 0.
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